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One of the lesser noted elements of the Lisbon Treaty (and Treaty on a Constitution for Europe that preceded it), 
was the limited but significant influence that Europe's regions were able to exert of the process. Regional successes 
at Lisbon included the inclusion of local and regional levels into the concept of subsidiarity and the right of the 
Committee of Regions (CoR) to challenge the Commission before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This regional 
renaissance came as something of a surprise as although the early 1990s had seen the brief flowering of the concept 
of the “Europe of Regions”, these hopes were to prove short lived. Even as regional governments in western Europe 
were flexing their political muscles, the European Union (EU) was looking to expand into areas where sub-national 
regional governance was weak or non-existent. This weakening of the regional tier, combined with the ineffective 
nature of EU regional access, particularly the Committee of Regions, led to disenchantment with the European 
project and turned some regional governments from Europhiles to mild sceptics. However, as the regional successes 
at Lisbon confirm, Europe's regions are back. This paper traces the rise and fall of the regional tier with particular 
reference to the changing nature of the expanded EU. As the paper explores, the expansion to the east has changed 
the very nature of the regional level with the eastern European Member States developing very limited forms of 
regional governance. In fact, the limited regional successes achieved at Lisbon obscures a continuing paradox 
within the EU. Although there continues to be pressure for greater regional involvement at the European level, the 
regional level is not a pan-European phenomenon. It is largely driven by autonomous “legislative” regions, which 
are a feature of western European states alone. This paper concludes by briefly examining this imbalance and its 
consequences in a post-Lisbon Europe. 
 





The events of November 1989 which culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall were to 
prove momentous for the governance of Europe. As the Communist bloc collapsed, the 
former states of COMECON looked to the stability of the European Union and within 15 
short years, the majority of East European states had been brought within the 
(fractious) European family. The European Union’s expansion had a profound effect on 
the operation of the Union itself and although much ink has been spilt discussing it, the 
final effects of the eastern expansion are yet to be fully understood. This article 
examines one small impact of the accession of the eastern states (the so called EU-10) 
plus East Germany on one particular aspect of the Union’s governance structure, namely 
Europe’s regional tier. 
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The development of federalism and strong regionalism in many western European 
states in the latter part of the Twentieth Century was an “unexpected” revolution.1 It 
occurred with far less fanfare than the supra-national revolution with which it was 
intimately connected but, in constitutional terms, it was no less significant. It saw the 
creation of regional governments across the European Union to the extent that some 
form of regionalism became norm in the majority of EU-15 Member States with only 




Today, of the 15 pre-2004 EU states three are formal federations (Austria, Germany and 
Belgium), two have legislative regions across the entire state (Italy and Spain), while 
Portugal, the UK and Finland all have one or more legislative regions within their 
borders. Beyond this, a variety of “meso” regions possessing non-legislative powers has 
emerged, particularly in France and Scandinavia.3 The exact nature of Europe’s regional 
tier and the reasons for its rise are too complex to be discussed in any detail here and 
are the focus of much academic work elsewhere.4
 
 This article focuses on the relationship 
between regional governments and the European Union particularly in the aftermath of 
the eastern expansion. It does so by briefly charting the rise of the western European 
regions to prominence in European affairs in the early 1990s and their subsequent and 
rapid decent to the periphery. This swift demise of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ has been 
followed by a recent re-emergence of ‘legislative’ regions as significant actors in the 
European game. This has seen these regions achieving a number of limited but 
significant gains through the Treaty of Lisbon, despite an environment that appears less 
favourable to the regional tier as a whole than that of the early 1990s. The reasons for 
the change in the role of regions in the EU can be traced, at least to some extent, to the 
changing nature of Europe itself, symbolised by the events of November 1989. These 
events and the subsequent EU membership of the former Communist bloc countries 
changed the dynamic of European Union politics as the centre of gravity shifted 
eastwards. 
For the powerful regions, it has seen them largely isolated in the EU-15 states of western 
Europe. Although Eastern Europe is not without its regions, their weakness means that 
talk of a European regional ‘tier’ is even more problematic than it was in the heady days 
of 1992. The imbalance between the legislative regions in many western states and the 
weak form of regionalism practiced in the EU-10 has led to an uncomfortable 
asymmetry in Europe’s regional balance. Although the long-term legacy of these events 
for Europe’s tier remains unclear, this article aims to provide some thoughts on the 
future of regions in this new European reality. 
                                                          
1 W. R. Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1980.  
2 Even in France, Corsica operates a very limited form of regional autonomy, while the non-European French 
territories all possess some form of legislative autonomy.  
3 The term region has always proved difficult to define. Sharpe in particular avoided it altogether, instead referring to 
“meso” governments which operate between the national and the local levels. This is the definition used in this paper, 
although it remains problematic. L.J. Sharpe, The Rise of Meso Government in Europe, London, Sage, 1993. 
4 See for example W. J. Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the 
European Union, London, Cavendish, 2002; M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial 
Restructuring and Political Change, London, Edward Elgar, 2000; J. Loughlin (ed.), Subnational Democracy in the 
European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, Oxford, OUP, 2001. 




The Rise of the Third Level – The Treaty on European Union 
 
By the 1990s, the parallel developments of the European Union and European political 
regionalism were beginning to clash. By 1992, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Belgium all possessed strong regional governments, with weaker non-legislative regions 
emerging in France. Many of these governments viewed the European tier as a political 
ally in their struggle for autonomy against the national state. However, in many cases, 
the EU also presented a significant challenge to the autonomy of these emerging 
regional governments. The problem for the regions stemmed from the fact that 
European policy continued to be treated by Member States as an extension of 
international affairs. As such internal governance structures were seen as being of little 
relevance. This did not reflect the reality of European Community Law and particularly 
its impact upon domestic constitutions. The early case law of the European Court of 
Justice had explicitly developed the concepts of Supremacy and Direct Effect as the key 
principles of European Community Law (much to the astonishment of some Member 
States),5 leading Lord Denning to make his famous analogy that European Community 
Law was like an incoming tide, it could not be held back, not even by the Constitutional 
limits of Member States.6
 
 
These developments came at a significant cost for the nascent regional governance 
structures. Regional autonomy was now subject to European, as well as national, legal 
limitations, but regional governments had no influence on their creation. The German 
Länder had achieved some success in addressing this issue domestically during the 
ratification process of the Single European Act (SEA).7
 
 However, the regional tier in 
1986/87 was still emerging and the German regions had few meaningful allies outside 
their borders. Although five of 15 Member States possessed a regional tier with 
legislative powers (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Spain) and a sixth had 
established a potentially significant non-legislative regional tier (France), only in 
Germany and Italy were the regions established constitutional actors. In practice, given 
the limited powers of the Italian Regioni, the German Länder were the only regions 
capable of exerting meaningful pressure on their national governments in this period. 
The European Union was thus a lonely place for regions in 1986. In contrast, by 1992, 
the Regional level began to look positively crowded. 
The SEA episode was very much the warm up act for the main event at Maastricht six 
years later. Buoyed by the limited success, the German Länder now set their sights a 
little higher. In addition, learning from the efforts of the German Länder in 1986, many 
other regional governments began lobbying key decision makers (particularly the 
Member States) at an early stage in the negotiating process. It was during this period 
that Europe’s regions, now styling themselves as Europe’s ‘third level’ of government, 
                                                          
5 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 58. 
6 Bulmer Ltd. v. J Bollinger SA [1974] 2 All ER 1226. 
7 For further discussion of this episode see, W. J. Hopkins, ‘The Future of Sub-National Governments in a Supra-
National World -- Lessons from the European Union March’, VUWLR Vol. 38, No. 19, 2007; and C. Jeffrey, The 
Länder Strike Back: Structures and Procedures of European Integration Policy in the German Federal System, 
Leicester University, Discussion Papers in Federal Studies, FS 94/2, 1994. 
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emerged as a significant force. The term emerged from the Länder themselves who 
began creating a loose alliance of regional governments from across Member States, 
with the aim of progressing a pan-European regional agenda. 
 
The establishment of this regional front at an early stage in the European negotiating 
process meant that the nascent 'third' level achieved significantly more from the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) than it had from the SEA. There were a number of reasons 
for this. The TEU with its quasi-constitutional tone was, by its very nature, more 
susceptible to the kind of structural change that the regions envisaged. This could be 
contrasted with the technical nature of the SEA (although the SEA was in fact no less 
constitutional in practice). In addition, the longer, more public negotiation process of 
the TEU lent itself to third-party influence on the final outcome. In this favourable 
environment, inter-regional co-operation was particularly effective. Regional demands 
were often voiced through Member States, rather than at the EU level, but were no less 
effective for this. The German government, for example, made the running on the 
creation of the Committee of the Regions, while the Belgians raised the issue of 
subsidiarity. In both cases, the actual pressure had come from the regional level as a 
whole. The regions thus developed a twin track approach of ensuring collective co-
ordination while also advancing their demands through those individual Member States, 
who could be persuaded to advance these positions under pressure from their own 
regions. 
 
Eventually, four pan-European regional demands were agreed. These received the 
blessing of several pan-European organisations, including the Association of European 
Regions. These were portrayed as the minimum price for regional support for any 
Treaty. Key amongst them was the establishment of a European Union institution that 
would represent regional interests. This, in the eyes of the Länder, would be the 
embryonic beginnings of a European senate to represent the ‘third level’ of European 
government beneath that of the Union/Community and the Member States. Others may 
have been less ambitious, but the overall aim remained the same: the creation of a 
regional voice at the European table. 
 
Europe’s regions also raised the issue of subsidiarity and demanded that the new 
Treaties recognise the principle that powers should only be exercised by the European 
Union (and indeed Member States), when smaller units of government (such as the 
regions) were unable to deliver the desired policy outcomes. In relation to this, they 
wished to see subsidiarity being policed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with 
either regions themselves, or failing that, a European regional institution having direct 
access to the Court to ensure the principle was upheld. A final demand was that the 
Council of Ministers allow regional ministers (from legislatively powerful regions) to sit 
as the national delegate when Member State government or domestic constitutional 
arrangements deemed this appropriate. 
 
The negotiations that surrounded the TEU saw three of these demands being met with 
only direct access to the ECJ being rejected outright by the Member States. One should 
not get over excited about the practical impact of the regions at this point, as events both 
during and after the ratification of the Treaty made it abundantly clear that these 
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regional successes were partial only. In particular, the “subsidiarity” clause proposed by 
the Belgian government (at the behest of their regions) soon morphed into a principle to 
defend Member States' interests, particularly in the eyes of unitary states such as the 
UK. The regions may have some power during the negotiation and ratification phases of 
the Treaty, but in the practical implementation of such Treaty amendments, the pan-
European regional front had little bite. Instead, regions had to operate within their own 
domestic circumstances, leaving some at a distinct disadvantage. The clearest example 
of this being the appointment of representatives to the new regional institution, the 
Committee of the Regions (and local authorities). This remained in the hands of the 
Member States and only when the regional (or local tiers) had sufficient political or 
constitutional power would such national delegations represent their interests.8
 
 
Nevertheless, despite the limited nature of these successes, that regions had achieved 
any success at all was noteworthy. The EC (and now the EU) was and is a Member State 
dominated institution. That a sub-national level of government had been heard on the 
European stage at all suggested that the regions were an emerging force. To quote 
Charlie Jeffrey, 1992 had seen the Länder and their European regional allies “strike 
back”.9 This, allied with the pro-regional tendencies of Commission President Delors 
(particularly his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to provide regional development funds 
directly to regional authorities) led many to explore the possibility of a ‘Europe of 
Regions’ not one of states. Some of the more extreme proponents of the thesis even 
began to hypothesise that the regions could even replace the Member-States as the sub-
European building blocks of the EU.10
 
 Although such claims were never made by most 
of the regional governments (and the Länder notably shied away from them) there 
seemed little doubt that, whatever its final shape, a 'Europe of the Regions' was at least a 
very real possibility, if not already a reality. 
Within five years, however, these predictions had proved wildly exaggerated. The 
weakness of the regional alliance had been cruelly exposed and, to quote Jeffrey again, 
this time the Länder, far from striking back, rather weakly, struck out.11
 
 The dream of a 
‘Europe of Regions’ lay ruined on the rocks of Amsterdam and Nice. So what went 
wrong? Why did the idea of a third level disappear so quickly in the aftermath of 
Maastricht? Answering these questions requires us to look both at the TEU and its 
aftermath and the parallel events taking place as the backdrop to the Union’s birth. 
These events have also, ironically, laid the foundations for a new regional voice, far less 
idealistic and ‘European’ than its 1992 counterpart. 
From Maastricht to Amsterdam - The Fall of the Third Level 
 
The 1992 negotiations and the approach of the powerful constitutional regions of the EU 
had been pan-European. Their theoretical basis was ‘Europeanist’ and had been 
premised on the idea that a general European regional tier was emerging or could be 
                                                          
8 W. J. Hopkins, Devolution in Context, op. cit., pp. 202-207. 
9 C. Jeffrey, op. cit. 
10 K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies, New York, The Free Press, 1995. 
11 C. Jeffery, ‘Farewell the Third Level? The German Länder in the European Policy Process’, Regional and Federal 
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1996, pp. 56–75.  
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developed throughout most if not all Member States. The open flank could thus be 
solved on the European level by the creation of regional institutions, and on the 
domestic, by the creation of a regional tier. 
 
Events, as they so often do, proved such ideas to be fanciful. Far from being the 
beginning of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, the Treaty on European Union was to prove the 
high water mark of this particular idea. The fall of the ‘Third Level’ and the whole 
‘Europe of the Regions’ idea was swift and occurred primarily because those who had 
championed it soon became disillusioned with the reality of what they had achieved. The 
catalyst for the demise of the European regional ideal was the failure of the Committee 
of the Regions (CoR). 
 
The CoR was flawed at birth, partly due to its lack of powers. These were far removed 
from the European Senate, imagined by the German Länder. The fact that the CoR was 
consultative only and could be ignored by both the Commission and the Council 
certainly did not help matters. However, future reforms could have remedied this, as 
had occurred with the European Parliament. Of much more concern was the fact that 
the Committee was dysfunctional and divided from the start. The reasons for this were 
to be found in its very membership. Although, during the heady days of the early 1990s, 
the regions had talked in terms of the CoR as an institution to represent the ‘third level’, 
the reality was that far from being a coherent entity the regions of the EU remained (and 
remain) trapped in their national contexts. The harsh reality was that, despite the 
encouragement of their more powerful ‘legislative’ cousins, all regions in the European 
Union were not equal. The powers and responsibilities of individual regions varied 
dramatically, and despite their talk of European involvement, the vast majority operated 
almost exclusively within a national context. 
 
The ‘Europe of the Regions’ thesis focussed almost exclusively on the more powerful 
regional governments such as those of Germany, Belgium and Spain and glossed over 
the rather inconvenient fact that most regions performed a far less important 
constitutional role. Even when weaker regions were discussed, as in relation to France, 
they were portrayed in a positive light or as precursor to a more powerful regional tier. 
The ‘Europe of the Regions’ view thesis even went as far as ignoring that in several 
Member States, notably the United Kingdom (prior to 1999) there were no regional 
governments at all. In glossing over this at the discussions surrounding the role of 
regions in the future Union, the powerful regions in particular had believed their own 
publicity. The reality came into sharp focus during the early days of the Committee of 
the Regions. 
 
The TEU gave no details as to how individual representatives on the Committee were to 
be appointed, leaving this to Member State discretion. The extent to which the national 
delegations actually comprised regional or even local representatives was thus in the 
hands of the national governments. In practice, only those regional governments with 
sufficient national political or constitutional power were able to ensure their presence 
on the Committee. In most cases, representatives came from local and regional levels 
with some purely national appointees. Few represented individual regional governments 
(as was the case with the German and Belgian regions, for example), with most being 
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national ‘delegations’ established to ‘represent’ the sub-national interests of a particular 
Member State. 
 
The result was a Committee which comprised a huge variety of local, regional and 
national representatives all with very different agendas. Importantly, they did not even 
agree on what the purpose of the Committee or on their roles within it. Some, 
particularly local government representatives, perceived the Committee as a technical 
body, charged with delivering opinions on the practical impacts of delivering proposed 
European Union policies. They often also regarded themselves as ‘national delegations’ 
and operated as such in the Committee. In contrast, representatives from the legislative 
regions in particular regarded the Committee’s purpose as providing policy analysis, 
often from the viewpoint of individual regions (who they represented). This concern 
with ‘national’ policies, such as the crisis in the Balkans was often ridiculed by those 
from unitary states, and seen as an example of the CoRs irrelevance, but for legislative 
regions such discussions could be very relevant. The more powerful, legislative regions 
undertook such a policy role within their own domestic systems and naturally saw the 
CoR as an extension of this. It would be these regions that would have to deal with the 
influx of refugees, for example, and such global issues could have significant resonance 
for powerful regional governments. They were obviously somewhat less relevant to the 
local councillor from Ireland or Portugal. It was not that either view was right, merely 
that each had a fundamentally different view of the purpose of the Committee.12
 
 
The dysfunctional nature of the CoR had significant consequences for both the 
Committee itself and the Europe’s regional tier. In the longer term, it would also have 
repercussions for the Union itself. For the Committee, the results were disastrous. The 
CoR, as an advisory body, relied exclusively upon the quality of its decisions for its 
influence. The decision-making institutions of the EU did not even have to respond to 
the Committee’s decisions. Unsurprisingly, as the result of the factors mentioned above, 
the opinions of the Committee were often poorly constructed and added little to the 
decision-making process of the Union. They were thus easily ignored. For the more 
powerful regions, particularly the German Länder, the failure of the Committee was a 
huge disappointment, leading to their abandonment of the whole ‘third level’ idea. 
Instead, they retreated into a nationally focussed approach to EU policy. The results of 
this were not positive for the Union, as potentially powerful supporters of the European 
project (and the Commission) – as a means of gaining influence against their federal 
level – now saw the EU in a far more sceptical light. To paraphrase Jeffrey, the pro-
European “let us in approach” characterised by the ‘Europe of the Regions’ idea had 
been replaced by a more sceptical cry of “leave us alone”.13
 
 
The results of these factors were made clearly visible in 1997 when the next phase of the 
European Union’s development culminated with the Treaty of Amsterdam. In contrast 
with the regional influence at Maastricht, Amsterdam was notable only for its absence. 
Little, if any, regional influence was discernable from the Treaty itself, despite the 
Committee of the Regions presenting various demands to the Member-States. The 
                                                          
12  To compound the problem of the local/regional divide, there was a tendency of the Committee to split on 
geographical grounds between southern and northern representatives. 
13 C. Jeffrey, ‘Regions and the EU: Letting them in and Leaving them Alone’, Federal Trust Papers, XX/04, 2004. 
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reason for this was that the powerful regions (particularly the Länder) had largely 
abandoned the CoR and the idea of a European approach to the regional question.14
 
 
Instead, their focus was on influencing European policies and more often reducing the 
influence of such policies on the regions through the medium of the national 
government. Without the backing of the legislative regions, the ‘Europe of the Regions’ 
itself was perceived as something of a busted flush. The Committee of the Regions might 
continue to talk in such terms, but without the strong support of its powerful regional 
members, it lacked any real leverage over the Member States. 
At the end of the 1990s, the future for Europe’s regions looked bleak. Their failure to 
gain access to the EU’s decision-making process had left many embittered with the 
European project turning many towards a defensive, nationally focussed policy. As the 
events of the next decade were to prove, the EU could do without further enemies. Yet, 
even as the ‘Europe of the Regions’ was enjoying its brief moment in the sun in late 
1980s, events to the east of EU were sowing the seeds of further regional problems for 
the Union. Resolving the regional issue was about to get a lot more difficult. 
 
The End of the Regional Revolution? Regions and Eastern Europe 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its European imperial ambitions, symbolised by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, opened a new chapter in the history of Europe and, by 
extension, the EU. First in 1990 and then in 2004 and 2007, the Union expanded to the 
east to bring the former members of COMECON into the fold. In doing so, Europe’s 
centre of gravity shifted eastwards. The final impact of these monumental changes to the 
European political landscape are yet to be fully played out, but one area in which the 
impact has been significant, although few have recognised it, was the role of the regional 
tier within the EU. 
 
The whole question of regional involvement in the European Union has largely been 
driven by the existence of autonomous ‘legislative’ regions, many of which have a 
significant role within their domestic constitutional system. Without these significant 
players, it is doubtful whether the regional issue would have even been recognised at all, 
whatever its merits. The political and constitutional power, that some legislative regions 
enjoy, ensures that their opinions are taken seriously at the European table, at least 
intermittently. By contrast, regional governments, which lack such power, struggle to 
exert any meaningful influence at the European level.15
                                                          
14 In fact, many senior regional leaders no longer attended. 
 If they have had any role at all, it 
has largely been on the coat tails of their more powerful cousins. The CoR too, lacking 
any leverage of its own, only has constitutional power when it is backed by the legislative 
regions. Thus, even the European Union’s regional voice, although often having the 
appearance of pan-Europeanism, remains deeply rooted in the powers that some 
regions exert within their domestic political systems (either de facto or de jure). For this 
reason, the expansion of the EU into eastern Europe had profound effects on the 
influence of the regional tier. The problem for the western regions was that, despite the 
early belief that regionalism would find fertile soil in the states of the former Communist 
15 For a discussion of local government regions see, W. John Hopkins, Devolution in Context, op. cit., pp. 137-164. 
Hopkins, ANZJES 2(1) 
63 
 
bloc, the reality has proved very different. The regional revolution, which was already 




With the exception of the former GDR, strong regional autonomy has not been a feature 
of post-communist constitutions. In fact, the extensions to the east in 2004 and 2007 
brought no new legislative regional governments into the European Union. The reasons 
for this are yet to be fully understood and are beyond the scope of this article.17 
However, the limited research into East European regionalism identifies some general 
arguments as to why this occurred.18
 
 The three explanatory approaches recognised have 
been categorised as transformative; EU conditionality and, more recently, a focus on 
sub-national governance. 
Early discussion of regions in the post-Communist era saw it as part of the democratic 
process. This transformative school saw regionalism as a European democratic right of 
passage for the previously Communist states. In the long term, this approach was 
characterised by a clear differentiation between the early expectations for regionalism in 
eastern Europe (particularly for micro-nationalities and ethnic minorities) and the 
actual outcomes. Authors have explained the failure of the transformative regional 
drivers in terms of the fear that such democratic reforms would weaken the existing 
nation-state. These fears were supported by historical memories of micro-national 
regions as threats to the stability of the state in the inter-war (1918-1939) and post-war 
(1945) periods, as well as the more recent examples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
To this might be added that western observed phenomenon that national politicians 
tend to support regionalism when in opposition, but not when they achieve power.19
 
 
Whatever the exact drivers, the imperative of securing the borders of the existing 
nation-state trumped the argument for democratic regionalisation in the formative 
years of the post-communist states. 
These arguments had links with the so-called EU conditionality explanatory theory. This 
viewed regionalism in the EU-10 through the lens of the EU accession process. This view 
began by seeing EU membership as a positive influence, driving the development of 
regional government, and thus countering the centralist tendencies mentioned above. 
As the accession process gathered pace, this EU driven regionalisation did not occur 
and, where regions were created at all, they were weak and avoided historical or 
geographic realities. In fact, some authors began to turn the argument on its head.  Far 
from seeing the EU as driving the creation of a regional tier, the realities of the EU 
accession process and its harsh requirements for acceptance of the acquis communitaire 
left little room for regional diversity.20
                                                          
16 Failed regional autonomy referendums in Portugal, Corsica and the North East of England marked the end of the 
regional movement in the west. 
 The priority for EU-10 was achieving the 
17 For a discussion of the rise of western regionalism see, M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: 
Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, London, Edward Elgar, 2000. 
18 D. Pitschel and M.W. Bauer, ‘Subnational Governance Approaches on the Rise – Reviewing a Decade of Eastern 
European Regionalization Research’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, July 2009, pp. 327-347. 
19 The Italian post-war experience is the clearest example of this. Although the regions were created as part of the 
constitution, the incoming Centre Right government reversed their support for them on election and they were not 
established for thirty years.  
20 In Romania, Transylvania has been divided into several administrative areas, with little historic basis. 
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requirements of EU membership. This was most easily achieved through central 
legislative diktat. Regional autonomy risked getting it the way.21 As the EU-10 joined the 
EU these imperatives have receded. In the light of a less frenetic political environment, 
regionalism is again being discussed, although now from a more indigenous 
perspective.22
 
 This has led academics to abandon the top-down approach and turn to 
the possibilities of domestic regional drivers. This academic shift may mirror a change 
in fortunes for the regional tier in east Europe. For now, the eastern states of the 
European Union, while not exactly region free, are certainly region light. 
Whatever the future holds for eastern regions, the different regional experiences of east 
and west Europe have had a significant impact on the extent of regional influence on the 
EU. This has rendered legislative regions with significant autonomy a largely western 
phenomenon, and created an increasing sense of asymmetry within the Union. It has 
also put a final nail in the coffin of the ‘Europe of Regions’ idea. 
 
A Regional Renaissance? 
 
The disappointment of many regions with the Maastricht reforms and the subsequent 
realisation that the ‘Europe of Regions’, was little more than a pithy slogan led many to 
assume that the regional ‘question’ in Europe, was merely a footnote to the EU’s 
development. This view was strengthened by the lack of regional allies in the new 
Member States. The regional renaissance of the 1990s that had underpinned the ‘Europe 
of the Regions’ concept appeared to have reached its geographical limits. As a result of 
this, strong regional governments had gone from being the ‘norm’ in European Union 
Member States to a minority constitutional fringe. This feeling of isolation may have 
enhanced the post-Maastricht tendency of the legislative regions to favour defensive 




This shift in emphasis saw several regions retreat back to their national roots and in 
some cases began to adopt a more critical stance towards the European project as a 
whole. The continuing concern of the German Länder that the EU offered an open flank 
to their domestic constitutional protections began to be shared by other regions and, far 
from being an ally against the central state, the EU began increasingly to be viewed as an 
‘enemy’ itself. The strong regions thus not only abandoned the ‘’Europe of Regions as 
symbolised by the CoR, but also focussed their energies less on getting into the EU’s 
decision process and more on excluding the EU altogether. This led to a more parochial 
approach by many regions, who increasingly focussed on lobbying the national level to 
defend their patch, rather than concerning themselves with creation of a pan-European 
regional lobby. Ironically, this would bring about a partial regional renaissance. 
 
                                                          
21 M. Keating, ‘Regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe: The Diffusion of a Western Model?’, in M. Keating and 
J. Hughes (eds.) The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European 
Integration, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2003.  
22 D. Pitschel and M.W. Bauer, op. cit. 24, p. 337. 
23 C. Jeffery, Farewell the Third Level, op. cit.  
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Asymmetrical Regionalism: Lisbon and the Regions 
 
The end of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ concept was not to be the end of the regional 
story, and reports of the death of Europe's regional tier were to prove greatly 
exaggerated. In fact, the regional level has proved far more resilient than might have 
been believed and those who imagined that it was no longer a feature of the EU have 
been proved as equally incorrect as those who proclaimed its impending dominance in 
the first place. The European Convention and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty have shown 
that the regional level is far from irrelevant to the future of the EU, but its place in the 
European constitutional and political structure is very different from that which was 
predicted in 1992. 
 
The failure of regional governments to have any significant impact at Amsterdam and 
subsequent Treaty reforms was due largely to a failure of the strong regions to back the 
demands of the wider regional tier. The CoR is a very weak player in the EU game, 
particularly on constitutional issues. These will be decided on the basis of negotiations 
between Member States, focussed on achieving the best deal for their constituencies. It 
is only when the CoR (and the wider regional tier) can co-opt a powerful ally or two that 
its views will become relevant. In reality, the CoR depends upon the commitment of the 
stronger constitutional regions for its leverage. In the case of Germany and Belgium, the 
ability of the regional tier to veto any European Treaty means that their views cannot be 
ignored.  In other countries, such as the UK and Spain, the power of the regional tier in 
European matters, although not constitutionally entrenched, can still be politically 
significant. In particular, the existence of regionalist/micro-nationalist parties 
(sometimes even in national or regional government) can have significant influence. In 
all cases, the regional levers are applied through the Member State and it is only when 
this eventuates that the Committee’s views have any real weight. In 1999 this did not 
occur. 
 
It was a different matter in 2002, as by then the regional tier had been realigned. The 
legislative regions had abandoned any idealistic notion of pan-Europeanism and instead 
now saw themselves as a distinct group which deserved a greater role in European 
affairs. This would only be achieved if they worked collectively on constitutional 
matters. It was with this realist aim in mind that the Conference of European Regions 
with Legislative Power (RegLeg) was established in 2001. The establishment of this 
political network of western European regions (which had its roots in the Flanders 
declaration of 2000) marked a recognition that the more powerful regions needed to go 
it alone in establishing greater influence in the EU. It also explicitly recognises that the 
regional question is a western European phenomenon at least for now. The regional tier 
has been further boosted by the establishment of strong devolved governments in the 
United Kingdom. Wales and Scotland, as micro-nationalist regions, were both interested 
in developing a European role and have been leading figures in the development of the 
RegLeg group. Ironically, it has been the legislative regions’ decision to act alone that 
has led to the general renaissance of regions in the EU. 
 
The fruits of this new co-operation were realised in the Constitutional Treaty and all 
have been carried forward to the Treaty of Lisbon. Both of these documents delivered a 
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number of ‘wins’ for the regional tier, which can largely be attributed to the RegLeg 
group’s formal and informal activities. The connection between the Lisbon Treaty and 
the regional advances of the 1990s, is also noticeable, with many significant regional 
demands related to (and building upon) those achieved at Maastricht. Perhaps, the most 
obvious example of this has been the granting of access to the European Court of Justice 
to the Committee of the Regions for actions alleging a breach of subsidiarity. For the 
regions, this marks the completion of unfinished business at Maastricht and clearly links 
the current regional demands back to those of 1992. 
 
This CoR power has been coupled with an explicit recognition that the principle of 
subsidiarity which now includes the regional levels in a revised version of Article 5(3): 
 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level.24
 
 
This clarification of the subsidiarity principle within the EU legislative process is 
another significant success for the regions and again can be linked back to the 1992 
negotiations. The new form is far more in line with that originally envisaged by the 
regional tier when it was introduced by Belgium, during the Maastricht negotiations. 
Protocol 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality takes 
the regional dimension further and expands upon the impact of subsidiarity, this time 
by ensuring regional consultation in the developed of EU legislation. For the first time, 
such consultation specifically makes reference to the regional (and local) tiers: 
 
Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such consultations 
shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of the action 
envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such 
consultations. It shall give reasons for its decision in its proposal.25
 
 
This protocol also outlines the early warning system, which, although of questionable 
effectiveness, has the potential to give regions the opportunity for involvement through 
those states where the second chamber is regional in its nature.26
 
 
Other achievements pushed for by the RegLeg group (and, incidentally, the CoR and the 
Association of European Regions) are more positive and include recognition of cultural 
and linguistic diversity of the EU as a core value, recognition of the principle of 
territorial cohesion across EU policies and a recognition that regional and local 
governments are ‘fundamental structures’, which the Union must respect. Perhaps 
surprisingly, small additional regional gains were achieved in the Lisbon Treaty, such as 
the inclusion of regional and local level references in the new Services of General 
Interest Protocol, as well as an extension of the Committee of the Regions’ mandate 
from four to five years, thus bringing it into line with the EU Parliament. 
                                                          
24 The Treaty on European Union, Article 5(3). 
25 Protocol no. 2. Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol make specific reference to legislative regions. 
26 In practice, this primarily applies only to Belgium, Austria and Germany. 




These reforms remain limited, but the fact that some regional demands (often in 
tandem with Member States ones) were incorporated within the final Lisbon Treaty at 
all is clearly an advance for the regions when compared with the failures of Amsterdam 
and Nice. The use of Member State leverage to achieve advances at the European level 
was the hallmark of the regional approach to the Convention (and later Lisbon) as it had 
been at Maastricht. However, these were achieved by a much smaller group of regions in 
2000 than in 1992. The nature of the regional ‘successes’ is also worthy of note as many 
continue to be at least partially defensive in nature, reflecting the legislative regions’ 
continued mild-scepticism towards the European project. 
 
Conclusion: The Future of Europe's Regions in the post-Lisbon EU 
 
The future for Europe’s regional tier in the post-Lisbon era remains unclear. The ability 
of RegLeg to co-operate and achieve some of their goals during the recent reform 
processes highlights their ability to co-operate effectively. The links back to the regional 
strategy at Maastricht are also hard to ignore. Whether this co-operation will extend 
beyond the Lisbon process remains to be seen, but the signs are that the RegLeg group 
will continue to operate to defend their interests. The key point here is ‘defend’, and the 
tone of the network’s comments remains focussed on this approach. They are well aware 
that the subsidiarity gains of the Lisbon/Convention process are only potential gains 
and everything will depend upon how they are applied in practice. The new recognition 
of the regional aspects of subsidiarity in particular comes with a number of 
uncertainties. The fact that the principle is now justifiable does not, in itself, mean that 
it will be a particularly effective concept. The ECJ has been reticent to engage with 
subsidiarity in the past and it is far from certain that the ECJ will warm to its new role as 
guardian of the principle. Although, it is clearly intended that the ECJ should apply the 
principle, whether it does so effectively will remain in the hands of the judges. One 
element in favour of such an effective judicial use of the term can be found in Germany 
where, despite scepticism, the Federal Constitutional Court became a somewhat 
enthusiastic user of the principle in rolling back the power of the Bund. In fact, its 
defence of federalism under the enhanced subsidiarity clause of the Basic Law proved 




Despite this inherent defensiveness of the legislative regions, there are hints that a re-
engagement with the European process is underway. To this end, ensuring that they are 
properly involved in European Union policy development, as envisaged by Protocol 2, is 
crucial. It is only through such an active engagement with the significant players in the 
regional tier that they can win back their current quasi-critical position towards the 
European project. 
 
The wider problem that the EU faces is how to incorporate the asymmetrical regional 
tier into the new constitutional structures. The third level is now divided not only by 
                                                          
27 G. Taylor, ‘Germany: A slow death for subsidiarity?’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
2009, pp. 139–154. 
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their domestic constitutional roles but by geography. Regions are largely a western 
phenomenon and legislative regions are exclusively so (if we put Finland in the 
“western” camp for these purposes). The asymmetrical nature of Europe’s regional tier 
makes dealing with this a significant challenge and resolving it will be a major challenge 
for post-Lisbon Europe. To this end, the signs of a convergence of approach between 
east and west towards the regional issue may make life significantly easier for the EU. 
The common factor is the emerging principle of Multi-Level Governance as a defining 
element of governance across the Union. 
 
The tendency of the European Union has always been to operate on a one-size-fits-all 
approach with asymmetry being seen as a danger to the European project or a weakness. 
Given that such asymmetrical structures are the norm for federal systems today, it 
seems strange that the European Union, that most unique of federal entities, shies away 
from them. Within the EU, Finland, Spain, Belgium, France, the UK, Italy and Portugal 
all operate asymmetrical federal or regional arrangements.28
 
 This has not caused the 
collapse of these states although it can make things politically and constitutionally 
messy. In dealing with the regional imbalance in the EU’s Member States (and perhaps 
in other matters), this asymmetrical approach also needs to be embraced. The EU needs 
to accept that the tempting symmetry of the Europe of the Regions idea was never going 
to be a reality and pan-European institutions such as the CoR, although good in theory, 
are always going to suffer from the reality of regional asymmetry. 
Instead, the EU must embrace the fact that it is a Europe with Regions and develop 
regional institutions and mechanisms that are not pan-European in nature, but instead 
reflect the unbalanced reality of European regional governance. This will not be easy 
given the east-west divide that currently exists. 
 
Although the various problems that have beset the European project in recent years may 
make it tempting to ignore the EU’s regional question, the political nature of European 
constitutionalism means that this particular European fault line cannot be ignored. In 
what is likely to be a difficult period for the European Union, the consequences of failing 
to resolve the regional issue are serious. Such a failure risks creating a disgruntled group 
of potentially powerful governments, where the European project should naturally find 
allies. Given the European Union’s experience of the past decade, this author would 
suggest that in the next few years, the European Union needs all the friends it can get. 
                                                          
28 The Spanish system is entirely asymmetrical with regions having an individual relationship with the state through 
their regional statute. Many regions such as Euskadi, Catalonia and Andalusia have higher autonomy than other 
regions. Belgium also operates an entirely asymmetrical system with over-lapping Regions and Communities 
particularly in regards to Brussels and the German Community. In other cases a variety of “special” autonomy applies 
to a number of so called peripheral regions, although this can be misleading. These regions account for over 15% of 
the populations of both the UK and Italy. For a general (if slightly dated) overview see D. J. Elazar (ed.), Federal 
Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, London, Longman, 1994. 
For a specifically European study see W. J. Hopkins, Devolution in Context, op. cit. 
